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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUTcY-DiSCHARGEs-EXCEPTION.-The

acceptance company made a

series of loans to the automobile dealer to finance the latter's purchases from
the manufacturer. In this particular case the creditor advanced to the dealer
ninety per cent of the factory price of the automobile. The dealer furnished the
other ten per cent, paid the manufacturer and obtained the car. Upon receipt
of the car the dealer executed and delivered a note to the creditor for the sum
advanced. He executed and delivered to the creditor, also, a bill of sale covering
the automobile, a chattel mortgage, and a trust receipt, wherein he agreed to
hold the car for the creditor and to sell only with the latter's consent. The dealer
sold the car in the regular course of business, but he did not account to the creditor for the proceeds from the sale. The creditor requested payment. The dealer
promised prompt remittance. Soon thereafter he filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy and was eventually discharged from his debts. The creditor brought
this action alleging a conversion of the automobile, and the debtor pleaded the
discharge in bankruptcy. The trial judge overruled the plea and ordered judgment for the plaintiff. That was affirmed in the state appellate court. Held, on
certiorari to the Supreme Court, judgment reversed; the claim is not for the
conversion of the car, but for money loaned, which is barred by the discharge
in bankruptcy. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 55 Sup. Ct. 151 (1934).
Liabilities for wilful or malicious injuries to property are not affected by a
discharge in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act, § 17 (2), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35. A pledgee's
sale of securities when the pledgor is not in default makes the pledgee a tortfeasor, and any pecuniary responsibility he may owe therefor to the pledgor is
not affected by the pledgee's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy. The act is
deemed to be wilful and malicious within the scope of § 17 (2). McIntyre v.
Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 37 Sup. Ct. 38, 61 L.Ed. 205 (1916). And a sale of
goods by a debtor, who has given the creditor a chattel mortgage covering the
things sold and who had retained the possession and use of the goods, is such a
wrongful and malicious act that the debtor's subsequent discharge in bankruptcy
will not bar an action for damages against him by the unsatisfied creditor. Mason
v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, 108 Atl. 267, 18 A.L.R. 1426 (1919). The measure of the
creditor's subsequent claim for damages is not the value of the things sold, nor
necessarily the amount of the original secured claim, but the pecuniary loss he
has gustained in fact by reason of the debtor's misuse of the security. Sabinal
Nat. Bank v. Bryant, 221 S.W. 940 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). In the instant case
the court held that the sale of the automobile was not a tort. The creditor's interest was a security interest. The sale could not have been wilful and malicious
because it was made by the debtor in the regular course of business and as the
parties must have intended it to be made. Cf. Bank of Williamsville v. Amherst
Motor Sales, 234 App. Div. 261, 254 N.Y.Supp. 825 (1932).
The creditor-plaintiff in the instant case contended, too, that the debtor's
failure to account for the proceeds was a breach of a fiduciary obligation and
that it was within the exception of § 17 (4) of the Bankruptcy Act, and was
not affected by the discharge in bankruptcy. The responsibility of a factor to
account to his principal is not such an obligation as comes within this exception.
See Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202, 11 L.Ed. 236 (1844), cited with approval
in the principal case. When goods have been sold on consignment, the seller must
show something more than resale by the buyer to fix upon him any such responsibility as will be unaffected by his subsequent discharge in bankruptcy. Swift &
Co. v. Bullard & Son, 3 F. (2d) 814 (N.D. Ga. 1925). He must show that the
buyer has first collected the price of the goods re-sold, perhaps that he has
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assigned the re-sale accounts, too, as security for the original price, or that the
buyer, if he is an individual, has appropriated the proceeds so collected to his
own personal use and not for any purpose incidental to the business enterprise.
Baker v. Bryant FertilizerCo., 271 Fed. 473 (C.C.A. 4th, 1921). The court in the
principal case has recognized that some such showing might affect the position
of a creditor like the plaintiff herein, because the court pointed out that the record did not present any question with respect to the "wilful conversion" of the
proceeds from the sale.
VERNON X. MILLER.

BILLS AND NOTES-ADEQUACY OF CoNsIDERATION.-An aged boarder executed
two negotiable promissory notes for $1,000 each; one was payable to the husband and the other to his wife, proprietors of the boarding house where the
maker resided. The notes were given as payment for personal services rendered
to the boarder, at his request, by the payees of the notes, beyond those included as
board; e.g., tending him while ill, taking him for outings, reading to him and
writing his letters. The boarder was not related to the payees. In an action on
the notes after the death of the maker, the defendant claimed lack of sufficient
consideration for the notes. Held, for plaintiff. Sufficient consideration exists to
establish the validity of the notes. In Re McAskills Estate, (Wis. 1934) 257 N.W.
177.
The mere fact that the notes were of a negotiable character implies a consideration. Wis. Stats. (1933) § 116.29. This presumption, however, is not conclusive, but has a bearing on the burden of proof. See Wickhem, Consideration
and Value in Negotiable Instruments (1926) 3 Wis. L. Rev. 321, 326. The effect
of the seal on the instrument is also only presumptive evidence of consideration,
which may be overcome. Wis. Stats. (1933) § 328.27. Absence or failure of consideration as a matter of defense against one not a holder in due course is incorporated in the negotiable instruments act in Wisconsin. Wis. Stats. (1933) §
116.33. In the instant case the payees performed the services at the maker's request and for which the maker acknowledged indebtedness beyond his board bill.
Under the circumstances therefore the payees were not mere volunteers so that
the services could be presumed gratuitous. The performance is consideration for
the promises to pay for these services. Messner v. Block, 100 Wis. 644, 76 N.W.
598 (1898). Since the payees and the maker were not related in any degree the
presumption arises that payment for them is intended and that there is consideration for such payment. McCurdy v. Boring, 27 N.D. 1, 146 N.W. 730 (1914).
Also under the circumstances the notes were not intended to be and were not
mere promises to make a gift and as such unenforceable after the donor's death.
Tyler v. Stitt, 127 Wis. 379, 106 N.W. 114 (1906). On the contrary, the notes
constituted a present, definite, and absolute obligation to pay. See Sheldon v.
Blackman, 188 Wis. 4, 205 N.W. 486 (1925). The determination of the value or
sufficiency as decided by the parties to the instrument is usually prevailing. Holz
v. Hanson, 115 Wis. 236, 91 N.W. 663 (1902). The court does not usually weigh
the quantum of consideration, but allows the parties to be the sole judges of the
benefits to be derived from their bargains. 3 R.C.L. 932 § 127 and cases cited.
When payment is made for services the value of which is indefinite or indeterminate, or largely a matter of opinion, the courts will not substitute its judgment
for that of the contracting parties. Sheldon v. Blackman, 188 Wis. 4, 205 N.W.
486 (1925). The value of the services is considered conclusively fixed by the

